On the "modern system" tactical defence and the look forward into a low force density reality

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I think I hinted before that the lack of WW2-esque front lines should have lead to much greater updates to land warfare doctrine than it did. I've recently read again the key chapter (ch. 3) of Stephen Biddle's "Military Power" and would like to present an example argument for my case.Biddle describes what he calls the "Modern System" of land warfare; how to survive firepower in the tactical defence, how to survive firepower in the tactical offence and how to break through and exploit.His "Modern System" is in my opinion both an excellent description for much 20th century warfare and a total misnomer at the same time. I think it's a misnomer because it's not "modern", but far below the potential and behind the times by half a century. We were just lucky to not have experienced a war that exposed the obsolescence of the now traditional doctrines.Biddle assumes that defenders cannot defend a static position without being overwhelmed by firepower (which is correct). He goes on to assume that the defender thus needs to withdraw from his position after brief firefights in order to fight another fight a bit farther back. Or another team needs to do the same. In either case, defence needs depth in order to slow down the breakthrough, delay the beginning of the enemy's exploitation phase and thus enable friendly reserves to launch a promising counterattack.It's a beautiful description of the state of the art defensive system of 1917-late 30's.There's a crucial problem, of course: This very same system wasn't much more than a WW1 Western Front and later a doctrinal system. It was impossible in late 1941 because of overextended forces; there are often simply not enough forces available to defend in depth. Biddle paid much attention to the breakout attempts of the Western Allies in Normandy '44; again a high force density scenario.His "modern system" is valid, save for the exception that it's invalid in low force density scenarios - that is, in most modern warfare.A defending (direct fire) team in a high force density scenario does indeed need to shoot and scoot - and to scoot backwards or at most sideways, for these are the only survivable routes. Backwards 120° is the most likely sector for withdrawal because concealed routes for repositioning are most likely to be found in this sector. The advancing enemy might be able to see other routes an reach them with his unbearable firepower.
This doesn't force it to retreat, to go backwards - to trade ground for blood. It could just as well reposition itself in order to get behind the attacker (an astonishingly effective tactic; tank platoons and snipers who did this in WW2 wreaked utterly disproportionate havoc). There aren't enemies everywhere "in front" of them, after all - there aren't "enough" enemies to restrict their choice of routes as much as in a high force density scenario.
Low force density furthermore lowers the chance that defenders are actually in place in order to meet an attacker. There's probably just a brigade on a 60 km 'front line' - with 20 km per battalion. That's about twice the width allocated to WW2 divisions and easily four times the width that an entire brigade should be assigned to defend in a delaying mission in a high intensity scenario. In short: The presence of defenders might be the exception to the rule. Many attackers could advance on roads using loud, bright red motor scooters and still reach their objective.
Even many higher force densities leave plenty room for infiltration and exfiltration on most terrains. No frontages can be assigned to formations in many conflicts; instead, areas and missions are being assigned. There is simply no front line, thus no portion of a front line can be assigned to a formation (or the other way around).The lack of a high force density front line, a partial collapse of Biddle's modern system tactical defence character and the lacking necessity of a breakthrough phase change very much. Biddle's "Modern system" is obsolete whenever modern forces cannot meet the force densities observed by Biddle in his look back on 20th century land warfare.We should look forward, understand what we need to do without a front line (and its very important functions), what we need to do with the forces that we have today and in the near future. Much has changed.
Again, just as before 1914, we only get partial and often misleading hints from small wars in underdeveloped countries. We need to read these signs, but we also need to reason ahead of the already observed in order to prevent that we're as awfully unprepared in the next great war as we've been in 1914.
S O
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Results of my little poll

. What do you want me to blog about?
Weird military theories 60 (55%)Bikini girls with big (g)uns! 34 (31%)
Almost nobody seems to like my funny video embeds. I'm shattered.The rejection of the civil rights stuff was surprisingly strong, too.What's the point of defending freedom against foreign powers if you don't maintain freedom at home?Bikini girls was not a serious option (even though I decorated two or three blog posts with reduced clothes girls).
S O
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Topics under preparation

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This is what I'm planning to write about in the next weeks. Feel free to contribute info or texts if you think you can:
RHS Giorgios Averoff (the ship)Modern Austrian defence policy/strategyFinnish infantry tactics and original features

German security policy blogs and milblogs (a list)

Back in 2007, I planned to get some others on board, to join the blog as regularly contributing authors - but they were all weary of writing. In the end, I contributed a few times to blogs of other people instead.It has become obvious over time that my idea of a good milblog is rather unique and thus I gave up the idea of regularly contributing authors, but I'm fine with tips and some help in research, especially when there are language barriers keeping me away from the best sources on a topic.
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About theories and their application in general

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I did recently mention the concept of accidental guerrillas; the idea that killing one wrong person spawns multiple new enemies.A commenter stated that he doesn't believe in this theory because the Taliban would have spawned way too many enemies pre-2001 if it was correct.Well, this touches on a very general problem; people have misunderstandings about how to apply theories (or non-scientific attempts to explain what's happening).Many scientific theories look at an issue from one angle, on one spot and make a correct statement with very limited applicability. The correctness depends on the correct conditions. A neutron can split an atom, but it has to be the right kind of atom, and the neutron's energy needs to be right as well. Newton's mechanics apply, but only at non-relativistic speeds. Certain theories about an optimal currency area are valuable, but only if labour is really mobile. A drug may cure a disease, but only so if the bacteria isn't resistant yet.In this case, the "accidental guerilla" explanation seems to be valid for the 2001-2011 time frame of the Western occupation of Afghanistan, but incorrect for the previous Taliban rule.Why? Well, the Taliban ruled under different conditions. The Hama option was feasible and valuable for them and an effective counter to the accidental guerilla problem, but to us it would be a perversion and has a negative value. Different circumstances - different dominant approaches - different outcomes.This is of course also applicable to my attempts to contribute to military theory (one of the things that differentiate this blog from almost all other MilBlogs). All but the most general theories apply only under certain circumstances in (hopefully well-defined) cases. Sometimes it's even up to other theories to define the limits of a given theory. That's how science and much else advances in the Western World; by incremental improvements coupled with a readiness of at least some people to accept the complicated or complex nature of their field of interest.
S O
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Comment

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This is a great opportunity to declare victory and get out of the mess without losing (much) face..

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Draft for German security policy: discussion parts (13) to (16)

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Comments and discussion on:

(13) Intervention without an alliance obligation
(14) Geographical orientation of the Bundeswehr
(15) Focus on potential for quick force expansion
(16) Protection of maritime trade
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More on horizontal cooperation

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This is a quote from chapter V.1 of the book "Blitzkrieg-Legende" about the France campaign 1940:

Am Morgen gelang der endgültige Durchbruch durch die Hügelkette westlich des Ardennenkanals, wo die Franzosen einen letzten Versuch unternommen hatten, den Brückenkopf von Sedan abzuriegeln. Von da an drangen die Panzerverbände fast ungehindert nach Western vor. Inzwischen war der sogenannten "operativen Führungsebene" längst das Heft des Handelns entglitten. Die Panzerwaffe führte sich vielmehr selbst. Bezeichnend hierfür ist eine Episode, die sich [...] an diesem Tag auf dem Marktplatz von Montcornet abspielte. Hier trafen General Guderian und Generalmajor Kempf aufeinander, dessen 6. Panzerdivision eigentlich dem Panzerkorps Reinhardt unterstand. Beide Generale beglückwünschten sich gegenseitig zu ihrem Erfolg, dann begannen sie, die durcheinander geratenen Kolonnen zu entwirren, und verteilten untereinander die Vormarschstraßen für den weiteren Angriff. Dies wäre eigentlich die Aufgabe des Generals v. Kleist gewesen.

Map of the first phase of the Westfeldzug
1940. Montcornet is in the southern part of the red area.I have only the German edition,so I guess my translation has to suffice:

The final breakthrough through the ridge-line west of the Ardennes canal succeeded, where the French had for a last time attempted to contain the bridgehead of Sedan. From there the armoured formations advanced almost without resistance westwards. In the meantime, the so-called "operational level of command" had long ago lost control. The armoured forces rather led themselves. Symptomatic for this was an episode which happened on this day on the market place of Montcornet. General Guderian and Major-General Kempf coincidentally met there. Kempf's 6th armoured division was assigned to the armoured corps Reinhardt. Both generals congratulated each other for their success, then they began to disentangle the marching columns and distributed among each other the further routes of advance. This was in actual fact the task of the General v. Kleist [Guderian's superior].

This is a historical example for what I attempted to push more into the spotlight in previous posts already: Less vertical control by superior, more horizontal cooperation. This is obviously totally opposed to the U.S. emphasis on "synchronization" that dominated military thinking in the 90's and helped a lot (together with Air-Land Battle thinking) to create the fetish about information superiority.Officers with suitable training and thinking do cooperate instead of compete or even attempt a free ride in challenges. The horizontal cooperation happens between the best-informed minds available for coordination. There's no need to inform a higher staff in detail about a fluid situation as for coordination. Few if any plans agreed on in horizontal coordination will be outdated before implementation.Let's have a theoretical example:A1 and A2 have a common superior in A. Their opponent is B and the best chance for success is a joint attack at the same time from different directions on B.Vertical coordination (synchronisation) would require A to know about the positions of A1, A2 and B and to guess the near-future movements of B correctly. It would order an attack at a given time from two given positions on B. B could ruin the whole plan by dodging the whole with movement because the process is slow.Horizontal cooperation would only require A1 and A2 to understand the situation and to stay in contact till both have manoeuvred into a good position and are ready for attack at the same time. Then they agree to attack immediately to exploit the opportunity. This attack cannot happen too late or too early unless they misunderstood the situation - a circumstance that would affect vertical coordination the in same way.
It's similar to two men carrying heavy furniture up some stairs. A third man giving orders from a distance is rarely even useful. The two have a much better, more direct grasp of the situation and most of the coordination needs to be done by them anyway.

The same principle can be applied to indirect fire support. There's no need to pool long-range fire support under centralised command if it could as well be allocated to individual manoeuvre elements who support simply everyone in their range - including other elements of their own kind. They could have too few indirect fire support for their own needs, and this would force even the least social commanding officers into cooperation and giving support as much as they receive support.

This could be very important in a modern setting, where we lack the force density for establishing and maintaining front lines in most scenarios and could thus not expect that centralised indirect fire support would be protected against raiders by a screen such as a front line.

No army anywhere seems to emphasise the importance and potential of horizontal cooperation. Even the German army (which is too content with its 19th century Auftragstaktik innovation) merely stresses the importance of staying in contact with neighbours for maintaining situational awareness and avoiding fratricide and gaps. I have read field manuals from eight countries plus many historical ones and none came even close to emphasise horizontal cooperation vs. vertical coordination or even give guidance about the relative strengths and weaknesses.This is one of the reasons why I consider even the Western military forces to be way behind the potential, in other words: Outdated. This happened before (around 1890-1913) and led to the extreme suffering of the First World War..

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