Fall Blau (case blue) was the title of the Axis summer offensive of 1942 on the Eastern Front.
Historical advance of the axis forces as part of Fall Blau - (c) by gdrEarly 1942.
Germany had needlessly declared war on the United States late in 1941 and had learned that the Soviet Union was still powerful despite the incredible Red Army losses of the second half of 1941. It was predictable that U.S. forces would make their involvement felt in the next year (1943), and the British were still building their forces and learning valuable lessons in North Africa. There were no reserves left for securing the undefended Western Mediterranean in the next winter - the Red Army had to be defeated decisively in 1942 if Hitler's military long-term strategy (defending the conquered regions against the superior economic power of the Allies) should stand a chance.
The Soviets expected the German OKW (supreme command of armed forces) to be intelligent and to seek a decisive battle in the centre of the front, near Moscow.
The Stavka (or Soviet High Command), was unable to discern the direction of the main German strategic offensive in 1942 that they were expecting. Stalin was convinced the primary German strategic goal in 1942 would be Moscow, in part due to Fall Kremel ("Case Kremlin"), a German deception plan aimed at Moscow. 57% of all Red Army troops were deployed in that region. However, the direction of the German offensive was still defended by the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts that between them accounted for 25% of all All-Arms armies, nearly 30% of all Soviet artillery, over 38% of all tanks and 42% of all Red Air force aircraft.
Obviously, Stavka (Soviet supreme command of armed forces) was in error when it assumed intelligent major decisions at the OKW.
The actual Fall Blau was an operation that made sense at first glance for a long war. It was meant to reduce the capability of the Soviets to maintain their war effort. The advance to Stalingrad was meant to take out this traffic bottleneck (both in terms of railway lines and Volga shipping) in order to secure the flank for the main push to the south. This latter main push had superficially two advantages; to capture the world-famous oil producing region of Baku and -possibly- to enlist the Caucasus people (such as the Chechens) which were well-known for not being loyal to Moscow or to anything Russian in general. It seems almost nobody in the OKW thought about enlisting locals at all, though. Most were likely already conscripted or deported anyway. The oil was -as usual- the primary motivator. Oh, and the Gulf region with its Iranian oil fields was 'just behind' the Caucasus as well.
I wrote "at first glance" and "superficially" for a reason: The whole idea was crap.Independent of what influential people might have thought at the time; the plan sucked.Stalin was easily able to disable the oil production facilities and refineries. The oil wells and refinery at the small Maikop oil field north of the Caucasus were thoroughly demolished when German troops conquered the area.
The wells might have been repairable in the summer of 1943, but certainly not in the long winter of 42/43. Oil refineries are extremely complicated installations with an incredible quantity of pipes, boilers and so on. A repair after a thorough demolition was uneconomical. The construction of a new refinery would take years, especially at the end of a thousands of kilometres long railway supply line. Germany could have made use of some oil from around Baku by late '43, but only so at the expense of railway capacity for the army. Oil containers would need to be shipped to Baku in mostly empty state and then be shipped back by railway (and few over the Black Sea).The Stalingrad as flank security idea was also crap:What was the flank security for the army at Stalingrad itself? The low morale Romanian troops (Romanians had little reason for being motivated to fight on the Eastern Front in '42 after their experiences of '40). This vulnerable part of the front was hardly providing security for the Caucasus advance as long as it was itself in peril.There were even more serious problems in the plan:The deception by Army Group Centre:STAVKA was led to concentrate forces near Moscow. What were they supposed to do with these forces after the main push to south became obvious during the summer? In the best case they would end up having hundreds of well-trained divisions ready for a summer offensive 1943. In worst case they would attempt a major offensive or two on their own. The bottleneck of the German supply lines near Rostov was an obvious target for a counter-offensive.Seriously, there was not some kind of Sahara, Himalayas or mega Bermuda Triangle south of the Caucasus region. The Americans and British would have been able to open a new front in Persia/Iran and would likely have been able to push the overextended German Army back to the Caucasus in '43. That would have stretched the allied shipping lanes, but also the German railway connections.The whole advance towards the Caucasus was unnecessary:To cut off the Caucasus region from Russia at Stalingrad was already enough. There was no need for capturing the economic riches of the Caucasus region (or what would be left after Red Army engineer demolition teams worked on them) simply because cutting them off from Russia would have sufficed.
On 29 July, German units blew up the last railroad links from central Russia to the Caucasus region.("When Titans Clashed", Glantz/House, p.121)
A possibly more promising OKW plan ("promising" entirely from an apolitical, purely operational art point of view) would have been to mount equal deception ops in the south (pointing at the Caucasus), in the centre (pointing at Moscow) and in the north (pointing at cutting Leningrad off for good). This would have left Stavka clueless.Some reserves could have been relocated from France and other occupied regions to Russia, especially after the British Empire troops got a bloody nose at Dieppe. Historically, such reserve movements only took place during the crisis of early '43. Hitler thought rather the other way around in '42 and sent fine divisions from the Eastern Front to Greece and France.The early offensives could have aimed at eliminating local problems at the front:- Capture of Sevastopol (South; Crimea)- Capture of Kerch (South; Crimea)- Interruption of the Murmansk railway somewhere east of Finland (instead of attacking Murmansk directly) in order to interrupt the North Atlantic connection between the SU and the UK.- multiple limited offensives in order to eliminate problematic salients- multiple local withdrawals in order to change the front line to a more easily defensible front lineThe second phase would have been to about a move towards a Don river line and towards Stalingrad to cut off both the Volga shipping and the railway lines between Russia and the Caucasus region. permanently. Alternatively an armour corps could have been tasked with dominating the steppe south of the upper Volga in order to block land traffic in the region permanently. This might even have substituted for the capture of Stalingrad.Non-German forces could have held the Crimea and the region around Rostov against whatever the Red Army could have mobilised for offensives in the Caucasus region. Few Western allies supply shipments through Persia/Iran could have reached the central front in autumn '42.
These two phases were mostly meant to improve the situation instead of aiming at a quick defeat of the enemy. They could have tuned the enemy's strength in the Moscow region to an optimal degree and would have allowed for maximum concentration of German high quality forces in Army Group Centre (leaving mostly 2nd rate divisions to defend north and south). The third phase could have been about a decisive battle for the Moscow region. By now, some of STAVKA's reserves should have been diverted away from the central front. This could have been a final and decisive battle - the Schwerpunkt for the whole European axis. It would have required maximum priority for resources, limited only by railway capacity.
A German success in such a final battle was rather unlikely, of course. The German army had lost too many motor vehicles, too many strong horses, too many young infantrymen, too many junior leaders. It had still problems with concentrations of T-34 and/or KV tanks due to too few long 75mm and 76 mm cannons in service and it had the inferior railway network capacity on its side.
This alternative plan is typical for me; first gain a solid stance, then strike. My martial arts training has probably left its mark.
I came to this conclusion with the advantage of hindsight and plenty of time. The people at the OKW did not have these advantages, but they were supposed to (and it was their job to) settle on a better plan than the fatally flawed and superficial Fall Blau. They had the advantage of being a group of highly experienced professionals (and admittedly a few jerks).They didn't get the urgency right, were distracted by a too indirect means (oil) away from the key (the political, economic and military concentration in the Moscow region) and accepted a major risk too much. The jerk at the top of the OKW is to blame as well, of course.
An early rival to the Naginata was the Nagamaki. Unlike the Naginata, it had about as much shaft length as blade length. At least some Nagamakis blades were furthermore straight instead of curved (still one-edged, though) and thus better usable as spears at the small expense of lesser slashing and cutting qualities.The Nagamaki first attracted my interest because of its look, but it's also an interesting example of a weapon being optimised for a niche.The long shaft offered some stand-off in melee, while the long blade made it easier to hit difficult targets in slashing movements. Target such as horse legs, for example - a target that was supposedly an important one for Nagamaki wielder in the 12th to 14th century. It did fit the same purpose as the Chinese Zhanmadao, a curved sword with very long blade. The Japanese also followed this path with the Nodachi. The Nagamaki apparently lost relevance when mounted combat lost relevance in Japanese warfare. ("Das Lexikon der Kampfkünste", Werner Lind).Cost-wise, Nagamakis were more expensive than Naginatas because of the longer blade, but less expensive than the likewise rare Nodachis. Many Nagamakis were probably modified to swords with normal grip length during the 15th and 16th centuries, and it appears as if in part for this reason no extant medieval copies are known.Two-handed weapons like this had a very different history in Europe than in East Asia.European two-handed weapons were either spears for close-order tactics (hoplites, Landsknechte), used before body armour was commonly affordable (Germanic frame) or used after body armour became so extremely good that shields became unnecessary (halberds, glaives; late medieval age till 17th century). The European development ended in the bayonet.The Japanese did use two-hand weapons extensively in the medieval age without fitting into these categories well. Especially the Japanese warrior-monks with their Naginatas left an impression. 